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Abstract
Productivity is an essential component of lasting corporate success. It is also a
critical ingredient in the recipe for making a vibrant and prosperous community.
Economics recognizes that both capital and labor make contributions to
productivity through the functions of investment and production. Enhancements to
productivity can be obtained in multiple areas, including technological advancement,
corporate expansion, market penetration, and product development. Sustained
productivity growth, however, is predicated upon continual process improvement and
market innovation.
Identifying precisely “who” and “what” are contributing to productivity is
challenging. Because capital and labor interact, it is difficult to determine whether the
positive effect is due to the man or the machine. Evaluating the contributions of labor
alone is complicated, as people are productive both as individuals and in working
together as a group. It is hard to imagine a situation where a competitive advantage is
obtained without cooperation. Nevertheless, economics is theoretically geared toward
atomistic contributions to productivity.
Making any significant achievement within a corporation or community requires
input from a variety of entities having a willingness to commit their time and energy to a
particular effort. Because the path to improvement involves making mistakes and
learning-by-doing, patience is involved. Often short-term gratification must be sacrificed
ii

for long-term gain; incurring costs today in the hope of revenues tomorrow. This tradeoff affects both costs and profits. Because short-term profits are the predominant
incentive for investment capital, and marginal costs are the key determinant of wages,
favorable behaviors on either the investment or production front are not automatically
rewarded. Attention must be given to asset development, if incentives are to be
structured properly.
In this paper, I emphasize the importance of using specific asset-based methods
and financial tools to fairly and efficiently distribute contributions to productivity.
Corporations will find these methods equally desirable because they can be used to
generate low-cost, highly-accessible finance capital. These incentive structures include
the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), as well as other financial instruments that
are built upon the foundation of the ESOP. These include the CSOP (Customer Stock
Ownership Plan), the CIC (Community Investment Corporation), and the CHA (Capital
Homesteading Account).
Although these variations of the ESOP address a wide variety of situations, they
have yet to be tax-qualified like the ESOP. I am hopeful that this will change. To cover
the landscape of what is available right now, however, the structures that include the
Community Development Corporation (CDC), the Community Land Trust (CLT), and
the Individual Development (IDA) are investigated.
Because the future prosperity of individuals, corporations, and communities
depends upon continuous improvement and innovation, contributions to productivity are
of primary importance. Just as important is the creation of a life and work environment
that is competitive, efficient, and fair.
iii
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Chapter One: Observations and Experiences
Conventional Economic Wisdom--Productivity and the Creation of Value
For over two hundred years, economists have been developing theories of value.
In spite of various competing arguments that preclude any full agreement in this area,
making the attribution and assessment of value a tangible, concrete, mathematical
exercise remains a primary goal of economics.
The production process is one way that value is created. The factor inputs of
capital and labor each have a unique contribution to productivity, one that is measured in
the marginal product of capital and labor. The marginal productivity of labor must equal
its marginal cost, or the wage. The marginal productivity of capital equals its rate of
return. The traditional assumption is that input costs adjust automatically, in response to
competitive pressures and the demands of the marketplace.
In addition the contributions made by the acknowledged factors of production
including capital and labor, contributions are also embodied in the efficiency of the
production process itself. It is expected that methods and processes improve over time,
with the development and implementation of new technologies ever-expanding
productive capacity. It is assumed that the productivity-enhancing effects of innovation
are realized by labor, as technological advancements incorporated into equipment,
machinery, tools and information processing make labor more efficient.
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For production to create value, current and future investment must occur.
Theoretically, this process is facilitated by a transformation of savings into investment, a
function that is performed by financial intermediaries. Traditional sources of finance
include loans generated by financial institutions or other financial intermediaries, and
public and private equity markets. Investment capital can also be generated within the
corporation, with the re-investment of retained earnings. Availability of this type of
finance is predicated upon the creation of surplus value, or profits. Today, a majority of
the capital that finances corporate expansion is carved out of retained earnings.
At this point, it can be noted that the theoretical conceptions of production and
investment are direct and straightforward. Simplicity is what makes this no-nonsense
approach possible. If economic conclusions are to be made on the basis of quantitative
analysis, a reductionist viewpoint is required. Driving toward tidy, concrete answers,
however, requires making a multitude of essential assumptions. I have found that these
artificially-imposed limitations make it virtually impossible to make an empirically
realistic or reliable determination of who, are what, contributes to productivity. Thus, the
wellspring of value-creation remains a nebulous and opaque entity.
Limitations of Conventional Economic Wisdom in the Attribution of Value
Regarding the economic models associated with the production process, there are
four areas where over-simplification has the potential to produce confusion and misunderstanding. First, there is an assertion that a person’s contribution in the valuecreation process can be measured directly by the marginal product, and that marginal
cost, or the wage, is a realistic reflection of this contribution. Second, there is the belief
that the benefits generated by technological development and advancement will
8

automatically be reaped by labor, albeit in an abstract fashion. Next, there is an
assumption that contribution to productivity that can be fully realized and measured at
any point in time, as a snap-shot view of the situation. Third, capital and labor are
viewed in a compartmentalized fashion, thus eliminating the possibility that a complex
relationship between the two is a source of productivity enhancement. Finally, the
treatment of an individual as distinct labor unit, with a unique marginal cost and product
attached, attributes value to individualized efforts that are motivated by competition.
There is no avenue to consider the possibility that collaboration, cooperation, and
collective effort creates value.
The conception of investment also has limitations that can be clearly identified.
Most questionable is the assumption that savings automatically transforms itself into
investment, as Say’s Law would attest. Economic theory views this process as naturally
efficient, guided by a quest to maximize the return on capital. With the expectation that
this process effectively occurs without intervention, within a mysterious black box, it
appears to me to be a magical thought.
Extracting any truth out of this assumption relies upon faith in financial markets.
One must believe that there is an innate capacity, or a natural proclivity on the part of the
financial sector to channel capital into productive investment. This interpretation ignores
the possibility that financial intermediaries and firms may have conflicting interests,
especially in their conception of the investment horizon. It is a reasonable expectation
that financial intermediaries will be motivated by the highest short-term returns.
Conversely, firms will find that innovation and development requires learning-by-doing,
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trial and error, and inevitable mis-steps. Because the innovative process is not linear, it
requires patience, risk-tolerance, and a long-term approach toward investment.
Without question, any attempt to quantify contributions to productivity so that the
larger question of value creation can be resolved is a necessarily imperfect exercise.
Human beings are rich, varied, intertwined and complicated, just like the environment in
which they live. Nevertheless, various professional experiences have led me to seriously
question whether the prevailing economic wisdom not only sacrifices completeness to
achieve tangible conclusions, but is actually misguided to the extent that efficiency and
fairness are routinely compromised.
In the next set of anecdotal examples, I will highlight how the commonly-held
economic viewpoints regarding contribution to productivity and value prove themselves
to be flawed. In these situational examples, there is no systemic means of linking
productivity and contribution to returns and rewards. The incentives are distorted, the
outcomes do not promote the achievement of long-term objectives, and an environment
that could have otherwise fostered continuous innovation and development is polluted.
These experiences have led me to search for market-based methods that fairly,
accurately, and efficiently distribute financial gains and the contributions made to
productivity. My findings will be discussed later in this paper, after I have covered the
anecdotal evidence that brought these concerns to the forefront.
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Chapter Two: Two Examples Coming from the Real World
A Situation Where Information has Value
Few companies last over 100 years, but NCR, formerly known as National Cash
Register, is one of them. NCR has always been in the business of automating
transactions, but since the 1980’s, the focus has narrowed to providing self-service
technologies within the retail and financial sectors.
From grocery store self check-out systems to automated teller machines (ATM’s),
NCR has given customers the ability to help themselves. Less apparent to the casual
observer, but equally significant in impact, are the back-office technologies pioneered by
NCR. One example of NCR technology that has radically altered back office operations
are image-based check and remittance processing systems. Fundamentally changing core
processes, these systems eliminate encoding, proofing, and sorting in all but the rarest of
occasions. Comprised of hardware equipped with image cameras and readers, along with
software that incorporates neural networks and artificial intelligence, these systems are
very sophisticated. They read multiple fields of what could be considered to otherwise be
indecipherable customer handwriting.
For customers that include money center banks, the U.S. government, and the
Federal Reserve, this technology has permanently altered the amount of administrative
labor required to run any back office financial operation. This image-based technology
that got its initial traction in check and remittance processing departments addresses a
11

multitude of functional areas. A host of documents, including loan and mortgage
originations, Certificates of Deposit and account opening forms, can all be handled with
limited human intervention.
It is important to note that the proliferation of this technology compliments the
recent growth of the internet. The ever-increasing number of documents generated online
capitalizes upon the efficiencies that have already been realized in the back office.
Because the complete process has already been dissected and well understood, both
existing and new systems can readily evolve.
To effectively translate human activity to machine operation, the cooperation of
the people that have been manually performing the process in the past is essential.
Imparting this knowledge is like a technology transfer, with the enabling methodology
referred to as a work flow analysis. This effort, which requires asking many detailed
questions, breaks a process into granular operations. For the technology to work
properly, for it to deliver the maximum benefit, the points of failure must be identified.
Furthermore, the opportunities for improving efficiency must be determined if the system
is to be cost-justified.
Here a conundrum arises: the individuals who provide the answers to the
questions—those who provide the key information and details that determine the efficacy
of system—are providing the justification for their own demise. Technological
advancement makes labor more productive, and as a result replaces it.
In this case, it is clear that a wage-based reward system does not take into
consideration either the short or long-term contributions that have been made in a highly
cooperative effort. Worse yet, there are in fact strong incentives to avoid the open
12

communication and sharing of practical, on-the-job information that promotes the
efficient implementation of the system.
Perspective regarding this situation, if guided by economic theory, provides
certain insights. With this assessment comes the acknowledgement that the proliferation
of technology eliminates jobs, yet offers the possibility of new types of employment.
These newly created opportunities may even be more desirable than the administrativelyoriented, manual, repetitive, relatively low-wage jobs that have been eliminated. The
opportunity exists to allocate labor more efficiently, into areas where machines are less
capable than humans. (As technology evolves, it is possible that this argument may
become irrelevant).
Nevertheless, the original problem endures: the contributions to productivity in
this particular situation are not correctly recognized or appropriately attributed. Because
the value is added in the asset development process, the contributions to productivity are
realized in the return on investment. Investment quality is reflected in the return on
investment, as well as in corporate profits. If the company is financing the investment
out of retained earnings, the company benefits in both the investment and production
spheres.
In this and many other situations like it, the quality of the asset and the investment
is predicated upon the contribution of knowledge and experience, not just the provision of
capital. The problem is that wages consider only the contributions to production, not the
impact upon investment. Capturing this contribution requires sharing in the profits or the
ownership of the corporation. This paper is committed investigating these asset-sharing
methods.
13

A Case Where Publicly-Raised Equity Capital Becomes a Blunt Instrument
Troy Systems Incorporated began as a company manufacturing and selling
Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) hardware and supplies. MICR technology
generates specifically-formatted, machine-readable characters or fonts. These numeric
characters conform to a universally-established format that is recognized by central banks
and financial institutions.
Troy’s original systems were industrial-grade impact-printing devices with
enormous MICR ribbons. The equipment was deployed in the back-offices of national
governments, central banks, blue-chip corporations, and financial institutions.
Applications which are still in use today include check and remittance printing, along
with the production of various other documents that are well-suited for machine
readability, including lottery tickets.
This technology evolved to include distributed laser-printing systems for bank
branches, insurance company offices, and regional or satellite corporate offices. Checks
could be printed instantaneously in payroll departments, at teller windows, and at
insurance company offices. This manageably-sized technology was affordable, flexible,
and applicable in a wide variety of environments. One notable application is the on-thespot adjudication and payment of insurance claims.
The emergence of online systems and the internet meant that the company had to
offer new systems that could capitalize on electronic payment technologies. To adapt to
rapidly-changing market conditions, Troy purchased corporations that had and existing
solution and customer base. These companies had turn-key systems that were built to
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utilize the national payment system owned by the Federal Reserve Bank, referred to as
the Automated Clearinghouse House (ACH) network.
The most prominent product acquired and developed at this time was an
electronic check system branded “eCheck Secure”. The initial application for eCheck
Secure was the nascent online brokerage industry. The electronic check system allowed
brokerage customers to trade instantaneously, at any time of day or night, from the
comfort of a home computer. Other applications followed, with eCheck offered as on
online payment system for internet shopping sights, electronic shopping carts, and online
financial institutions. The eCheck Secure product was the earliest entrant in this market
that would later be dominated by a few players.
Troy was a relatively small company, thus investment capital would have to be
raised to acquire the companies that offered the electronic payment solutions. The
decision was made that the family-owned company would go public. The strategy was to
acquire other companies with stock rather than cash or debt. Throughout the technology
industry, stock had become the currency for acquisitions.
This change in ownership gave employees the opportunity to participate in one of
two ways. The first method, and Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP), was made
available to all employees. This program allowed employees to purchase discounted
company stock that could be sold once the company completed the ownership transition.
The second method of distributing ownership was through company stock options offered
to key company employees. Some of these options were gifted, and others were subject
to future purchase. These were restricted stock options that could not be executed until a
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certain target date a few years after the corporation became listed on the public stock
market.
The company went public in 2000, at the height of technology IPO wave. Soon
after Troy went public, it became relatively clear that Troy stock, like other technology
stocks, gained value from speculative investment activity. The company quickly
developed a formula for maximizing stock value by issuing a press release every Friday,
one in which the announcement would be made that at least one new customer had been
secured.
Troy stock values soared every Friday, exhibiting exponential gains in value. The
pressure to produce a new customer announcement every Friday became intense.
Influencing investor expectations and maintaining a high level of exposure and interest
became more critical, as the competition from other IPO’s intensified. The beneficiaries
of this predictable pattern were investors or outsiders that were not affected selling
restrictions. Employees that purchased stock through the ESPP were also able to profit,
as were extended family members that were not directly involved in the operations of the
company.
Most likely to benefit were the ESPP participants who had a shorter-term view of
their employment or the company itself; employees with a longer-term view were lesslikely to sell their stock, anticipating that the stock would have sustainable value. Some
held their stock out of company loyalty, others had a basic perception that investing in
public equity markets meant long-term holding to realize value.
When the technology sector crashed a few years later, Troy stock values went
down with the rest of the technology stock crowd. The stock value had gone from a
16

height of over $100 per share to less than $2.00 per share, just as the window for selling
restricted stock options had opened. The company eventually went back to private
ownership, with the original owners buying out the prior owners and management of the
acquired companies at a financial low-point.
In this case, incentives for contributing to productivity have been perverted.
Those who benefited included the following: 1) family members who held stock with no
restrictions; 2) employees with a short-term attitude having less concern for the company
as an ongoing concern; and 3) the original private owners of Troy who purchased
companies with real products and revenue streams for a fraction of their original, preacquisition value.
This distortion meant that key, productive employees of Troy Systems with
restricted stock options, along with the employees and owners of the acquired
corporations that made real contributions to productivity, were on the losing side of the
transaction. Employees and investors that bought-into the corporation, who exhibited
patience and developed trust—two positive qualities that are capable of enhancing
productivity over time—either did not reap any rewards, or sacrificed the initial value of
their corporations in the process.
Public equity markets are just one avenue for obtaining finance capital. As a
result of my observations and experiences, I have investigated other methods of raising
finance capital that have a greater propensity to fairly and efficiently combine investment
with ownership, for both employees and other stakeholders. In the next section, I provide
an overview of the risks associated with traditional methods of obtaining finance capital,
along with what I perceive to be more desirable, yet practical alternatives.
17

Chapter Three: Practical Alternatives for Creating “Good” Investment Capital
For individuals, corporations, and communities to become more resilient and
productive, investment in current and future capacity must be made. This is becoming
increasingly more difficult today, given the current economic environment in which the
availability of corporate finance is very limited, even for companies that have a solid
track record and business plan. Constriction of industrial credit was a trigger of
economic crisis, and its continued scarcity is thwarting economic recovery today.
The dearth of capital can in part be attributed to the complexion of global capital.
This powerful economic force is naturally focused on short-term gains, and little
concerned with long-term value. These are the new rules for competing in the investment
world, and many corporations, and most individuals, are no match for this highlyfocused, highly-trained juggernaut. Non-professional financiers will most likely be on
the losing side of the bet until new ways of approaching investment opportunities are
championed.
The solutions offered in this paper shift the focus from large, impersonal outside
finance markets to internal opportunities, where corporations, communities, employees,
customers, and individuals have the opportunity to invest in one another. This approach
creates a competitive advantage in three ways: 1) knowledge of sophisticated financial
markets is not what matters, rather the information regarding the specific business, which
is more readily available on the inside; 2) all parties have skin in the game, thus more
18

commitment to one another; and 3) the actions of all participants have the capacity to
effect the outcome, or the return on investment.
It is more critical than ever for corporations and individuals to strive for
efficiency, develop new processes and technologies, and foster a culture of innovation to
survive. Because business conditions are increasingly driven by cost containment,
culminating in a global race to the bottom, labor markets are precarious, wages are
stagnant, and unemployment is high. Employers are challenged to maximize employee
productivity and invest in new technology to stay competitive, at a time when capital is
incredibly scarce. Retaining a customer base is more challenging, as intense price
competition erodes loyalty and forces defections. Both companies and individuals need
equity cushions to survive today, and expand in the future.
This paper is about corporations, employees, customers, and community members
using certain structures in the current legal and financial system to distribute assets safely
and effectively. In the process of creating and maintaining these enabling structures,
participants cooperate with one another. It is in the very act of cooperating where
productivity begins to thrive, where assets built today become the solid financial
foundation of tomorrow.
It was Louis Kelso, lawyer-economist and inventor of the ESOP (Employee Stock
Ownership Plan), who developed the philosophical and legal architecture capable of
harnessing this potential energy. Although the details of the ESOP will be discussed at a
later point in this paper, Kelso’s broader perspective that informed the invention of the
ESOP is important at this point in the discussion. The comments that Kelso (1975) made
in an interview with the journalist Mike Wallace have contemporary resonance:
19

“Americans," says Kelso, "are a nation of industrial sharecroppers who work for
somebody else and have no other source of income. If a man owns something that
will produce a second income, he'll be a better customer for the things that
American industry produces. But the problem is how to get the working man that
second income" (Kelso Institute, 2000, p.1).
Individuals need assets, and corporations need finance. Individuals and
companies working together, using the proper financial instruments and structures, can
accomplish this task. This collaboration also creates a competitive advantage in that a
closer alignment of production and consumption better serves real needs.
What is required is a change in our thinking about financial intermediaries. What
I am suggesting is a flattening of the bureaucratic structure that provides finance, with
consumers and producers working directly together, literally or figuratively as a
community, to meet their finance needs. Much legitimate demand for finance is never
met, given that most financial enterprises are not in the business of deeply understanding
the nitty-gritty of business enterprises, unless the finance arm is private equity, where the
goal of finance is often to “possess” a company rather than support its growth or
expansion.
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI’s) are by design an
exception, in that their organizational structure fosters the development of community,
company or industry-specific expertise, so that in-depth understanding can be used to
guide finance decisions. This hands-on, cooperative, more localized approach to finance
has its place, even in a structure that brings end users, workers, and corporations together
at the planning and development table. In stark contrast, global capital is not
fundamentally structured to have either knowledge of, or direct connection with, the
community, industry, or company. In fact, the recent growth in the finance industry has
20

been in the development of financial vehicles that fully alienate capital from its
productive application, by selling-off, reconstituting, pooling, and subdividing whatever
was the original purpose of finance. Such examples are collateralized debt obligations
and credit default swaps, the culprits in the recent crisis. In simple terms, bankers that do
not know the end-user customer distort markets and cause systemic problems.
In the mean time, I have written about providing asset building opportunities
primarily in closed markets, where speculation is not an issue. Because they are closed
markets, it is not a zero sum game, with one winner and one loser. Both parties win by
cooperating with one another. The next section of this paper addresses asset-building
approaches that can be used today; they are practically, politically, and institutionally
feasible.
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Chapter Four: Overview of Asset-Distribution Methods
Rewarding All Stakeholders for Their Contributions to Productivity
In this paper, I provide an overview of financial instruments and organizational
structures that are either expressly designed, or inherently capable of sharing assets. In
each case, I point out their intrinsic strengths and weaknesses, and compare the
instruments to one another. In some cases, I find that a financial instrument or structure
that is not available today is superior to what already exists. I present both what is
available now and discuss how the situation could evolve.
The tools that I favor build assets out of current productivity, using financial
structures and instruments that are already part of the U.S. legal fabric. These tools
distribute productivity to stakeholders, who are defined here as those with a fair claim, or
an earned or natural right to the distribution. It is the participation of these stakeholders,
either as employees, customers, or community members, that fundamentally contributes
to the success of the entity in the first place. Thus, the distribution is like an earned
endowment.
These earned endowments include equity stakes, property ownership, matched
accounts for individuals, and shared ownership of public goods and services. In
searching for the best methods to fairly and efficiently distribute assets, I have focused
upon four areas of opportunity. First, I will cover corporate-sponsored plans that extend
ownership to employees. Second, the opportunity to expand corporate ownership to
22

include customers is investigated. Next, I discuss community-based development and
ownership of both private and public assets. Finally, individual accounts that provide a
repository for assets are examined.
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Chapter Five: Corporate-sponsored Plans that Incorporate Employee Ownership
From the Defined-benefit Account to the Defined-contribution Account
The earliest form of asset-sharing and distribution for corporate employees came
in the form of a pension plan. The earliest pension accounts were termed defined benefit
plans, in that the company would promise an employee a defined benefit, or a certain
monthly amount, after retirement. The employee had no responsibility or control over
the pension account, which was administrated by a trustee.
By the 1960’s, traditional defined-benefit plans had earned a reputation for being
under-funded and lacking in transparency. By the early 1970’s, there was a groundswell
of public support for pension reform, which culminated in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. This sweeping legislation formally recognized
the financial vehicles that could be offered within corporate pension plans, and specified
the tax incentives, accounting rules, and notification/reporting requirements that would be
required for each type of account. ERISA also clarified issues regarding employee
participation, distribution, vesting, matching and termination.
From an employee perspective, ERISA was especially significant for two reasons.
First, employee recourse rights were mandated. As specified within the U.S. Department
of Labor’s Frequently Asked Questions about Pension Plans and ERISA, pension plan
beneficiaries have “the right to sue for benefits and breaches of fiduciary duty.” The
second important provision, applicable only to defined benefit plans, was the creation of
24

the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. This federally chartered corporation is
defined within the aforementioned Department of Labor Frequently Asked Questions as
an entity that “guarantees payment of certain benefits if a defined plan is terminated”
(Department of Labor, p. 1, 2010).
Types of Defined-contribution Stock Plans
ESOP, ESPP, Stock Option Plan, and Individual Equity Plans.
While establishing rules and regulations for all pension plans was historically
significant, the fact that ERISA re-defined what constitutes a pension plan was
revolutionary. ERISA birthed the defined-contribution pension account, the most popular
form of pension plan in existence today. A defined-contribution account defines the
amount of cash or stock that the employer contributes to an account, but does not
guarantee a certain monthly or lump-sum payout at retirement. The balance in a definedbenefit account is invested, usually in some type of stock plan. According to a National
Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) article titled “How to Choose an Employee
Stock Plan for Your Company”, defined-contribution stock-based plans fit into four
broad categories. These categories include the ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan),
the ESPP (Employee Stock Purchase Plan), Stock Option Plan, and Individual Equity
Plans (including the gifting or purchase of restricted stock). (National Center for
Employee Ownership, 2010).
A Focus on the ESOP—its Unique History and Legal Framework
The first stock-based plan in the NCEO categorical reference is the ESOP.
Because the ESOP is the only defined-contribution plan given special provisions within
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ERISA, I will now cover its unique aspects. Also, I will highlight potential areas of
confusion between the ESOP and the other stock-based plans.
Unlike other financial instruments that have emerged after-the-fact out of the
financial system’s legal framework, the ESOP was fully intentional. The brainchild of
lawyer-economist Louis Kelso, the ESOP is an innovation with no financial or legal
precedent. Although the worker cooperative shares the premise of employee ownership
with the ESOP, the enabling financial architecture of the ESOP is unique.
According to historical information published by the Kelso Institute (2000), the
ESOP was first used in 1956 to facilitate an employee leveraged-buyout of Peninsula
Newspapers, Inc. of Palo Alto, California. Less than a few decades later, the ESOP was
formally recognized by the U.S. Federal Government, with the passage of the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act, and finally in 1974, the ESOP was written into ERISA as a
special provision. The ESOP would be exempted from a rule restricting pension funds
from investing more 10% in company stock. This rule, which had been conceived to
protect employees from the risk associated with a non-diversified portfolio, also made it
impossible to transfer a significant percentage of corporate ownership to employees.
(Kelso Institute, 2000).
Because the ESOP was recognized by many as both an ingenious and practical
method of transitioning corporate ownership, special tax provisions to make a change of
control more financially feasible became part of the legal recognition of the ESOP. In the
past, large tax liabilities made it difficult for owners to pass the ownership of a company
to other stakeholders. Another problem was that stakeholders often could not raise the
capital to buy out the owners.
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The ESOP solved this problem with favorable tax treatment bequeathed to it
within ERISA. Of particular note are three special ESOP tax provisions that are
highlighted within The Democracy Collaborative at the University of Maryland’s 2005
book titled Building Wealth: The New Asset-Based Approach to Solving Social and
Economic Problems. The first provision addresses the large tax liability that owners
incur when selling a private corporation. To offset this significant expense, the owners of
closely-held corporations, as long as they own at least 30% of the corporation, can defer
capital gains tax when the company is sold to a worker-owned coop or an ESOP. The
next ESOP tax provision aids employees in raising sufficient capital to buy-out a
corporation. Given that employees in nearly all instances lack the capital to execute an
employee buy-out, the ESOP has been IRS-qualified to buy shares from owners using
tax-deductible corporate funds. These funds may be obtained by borrowing against the
future earnings of the company. The final ESOP special tax provision applies once a
change of control occurs, when a lack of liquidity may pose a problem. To increase the
chance that the ESOP will be a long-term, ongoing concern, it is allowed to fund itself
with tax-deductible money or stock contributions. (The Democracy Collaborative at the
University of Maryland, 2005).
Confusion between the ESOP and other stock-based plans.
At this point, it is important to re-emphasize that the ESOP is entirely different
than the other recognizable stock-based plans. Because it is both common and
understandable that the ESOP is frequently confused with the ubiquitous instrument
known as The Section 401(k) Plan, discussing the key distinctions between them is
critical. As documented by Wang in 2002, the 401(k), in contrast with the ESOP, was
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not expressly established as part of the 1974 ERISA legislation. It was invented afterthe-fact by private pension fund advisor Theodore Benna. The special ESOP exemption
within ERISA was the enabler, however, in that it opened a loophole for the 401(k). In
creating the 401(k), Benna took advantage of the ESOP exemption that allowed definedcontribution plans to have portfolios with more than a 10% investment in company stock.
In addition, the 401(k) could also be crafted so that corporations could match employee
deductions with company stock, tax-free. (Wang, 2002).
The blurring of lines between the ESOP and the 401 (k) was just one point of
confusion that was created with the advent of defined-contribution plans. The new types
of accounts that had specific treatment within ERISA were complex on their own merit,
before even considering those that evolved out of the legislation. Given the difficulty, the
law of unintended consequences displaced the ability to anticipate permutations and
innovations that would come out of the legislation. Simply the nomenclature used to
describe the sophisticated instruments was not intuitive, in that the difference between
stock “ownership”, “purchase”, and “option” was not readily apparent.
As a result, there is still much confusion when one attempts to distinguish one
defined-contribution plan from another. There are some qualities of defined-benefit
contribution plans where generalizations can be made, however; and this is where I now
turn the attention.
The Impact of Defined-contribution Plans
An employer’s perspective.
Cutting through the aforementioned confusion, in addition to navigating the
complex details of defined-contribution plans, proved to be time-consuming for both
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employers and their employees. As a result, employers would incur large, tangible set-up
and maintenance costs in establishing defined-contribution plans. The substantial reward,
however, would be the employer’s ability to shift the responsibility for the performance
of the pension account to the employee. This change of control relieved the employer of
the commitment attached to defined-benefit plans—the promise to pay the employee a
certain fixed amount, irregardless of any market conditions. Another desirable element
of the defined-contribution plans was the provision of significant tax-based incentives.
These tax breaks had the effect of boosting corporate earnings, the effects of which were
magnified if the employer were to contribute company stock to the plan.
An employee’s perspective.
Whereas the impact of the defined-contribution plan on employers was largely
positive, the effect upon employees is a mixed bag. Whether employees would fare
better or worse with the defined-contribution plan relative to the defined-benefit plan
would depend to a large extent upon the employer’s stock performance, stock market
conditions, and the financial management abilities of the employee.
To properly manage the defined-contribution account, the employee had to first
understand the provisions of the account. There were specific rules, requirements, and
timeframes for enrolling, vesting, allocating, withdrawing, and terminating. Attaining the
knowledge to establish a comfort level would require a substantial commitment of both
time and energy. A labor force that had been accustomed to counting upon a prespecified amount at retirement had to take financial control, and the payout at retirement
would hinge upon the employee’s ability to engage.
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Because most defined-contribution plans were populated with investments in the
public stock market, the employee had to personally contend with market-based risk. As
with an individual financial portfolio, self-determined market strategies could be
executed by the employee, within the boundaries of investment options provided by an
employer. Given the significant responsibility involved, in addition to the special
initiative required to sign-up for the account in the first place, many employees did not
even enroll.
It was now up to the employee, fully dependent upon the stock market, to either
reap the rewards or suffer the losses. ERISA had delivered on its goal to provide more
information and control over the pension account to the employee, in an environment
where not all employers had been competent in performing their fiduciary duty. The
price of this emancipation was the absorption of responsibility and risk; the reward would
be the opportunity to build assets above and beyond a defined-benefit level.
Resting upon this observation, we conclude generalizations regarding definedcontribution benefit plans. Now we move forward to establish criteria that will identify
specific differences between the various defined-benefit accounts.
Criteria for Evaluating Defined-contribution Benefit Plans
Today, the level of risk and the opportunities for reward depend upon the type of
defined-contribution plan that the company offers. Each plan differs in how it shares the
gains from productivity today, and fosters continuing productivity growth in the future.
For corporate asset building programs to be helpful and effective, they must thoughtfully
balance equality with meritocracy and risk with reward. Going a step further, if a
corporation desires to be a significant, positive force in society, one that provides
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solutions to the larger problems the civilization is facing, the opportunity lies here: to
make inclusive plans that offer individuals with limited ability to generate assets
anywhere else, given their limited access to capital, credit or savings, the ability to build
solid financial assets in their workplace pension plan.
In determining the precise factors that make a defined-contribution benefit
pension plan most capable in achieving the goal of building assets for employees, I have
established the following criteria:
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1. Offering the opportunity to build equity for a larger number of employees is
better than one that builds equity for a fewer number.
2. Providing asset-building capability without requiring an equity contribution
from the employee is preferable, in that the employees at the lowest income
levels with less ability to save are not prevented from participating.
3. Closely coupling employee productivity with reward is most favorable.
4. Facilitating the sale of company stock through a market mechanism that
values fundamentals, and mitigates speculative risk (closely aligning
productivity with reward).
5. Making employees as owners privy to information, so that they are able to
augment the perspective of the plan fiduciary with their own analysis of the
situation.
6. Providing the opportunity for employees to participate more fully, both as
owners of company stock and as individuals fully vested in the long-term
success of the company.
7. Opening a window for the sale of stock, or allowing a hardship withdrawal or
loan in the case of a qualifying event, i.e. disability, elder care, hospice care,
medical expenses.
8. Allowing the employee to borrow against the pension account for the purpose
of building other forms of lasting assets, i.e. education, quality child care,
housing.
9. Establishing a structure that encourages continuous improvement in
productivity on the part of all employees, in a manner that increases the
likelihood that the company will be an ongoing concern.
Given the large wish list, business economists would be the first to ask, “what is
in it for the corporation”? The traditional response would be that employers want defined
contribution plans because they significantly reduce the future liability associated with
defined-benefit plans. Therefore, asking for too many things in a defined-contribution
plan would eliminate its competitive advantage from a cost-avoidance perspective.
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Furthermore, the neoclassical model assumes that defined-contribution plans can be
conveniently sold as an employee benefit like health care, providing the justification for
the company to reduce wages. Or, the argument could be made that the definedcontribution plan would simply be used as a self-serving tool to unload company stock.
(Clearly this line of reasoning requires that corporate compensation policies are rational,
an assumption that empirical evidence could contradict).
The neoclassical model does support the possibility that employers would offer
defined-contribution plans simply because they have the potential to maximize the wellbeing of employees, thus making loyalty and productivity the potential reward. One
point that both employers and employees can agree upon is that increasing productivity is
good, both in the short and long run. Undoubtedly, optimizing productivity is a key
objective in the crafting of a defined-contribution plan.
Aside from the effect of the defined-benefit plan upon the employer/employee
bargain, there is another critical dimension to examine, the relationship of the pension
plan to corporate finance. ERISA offers employers a variety of tax incentives to sweeten
the defined-contribution plans, and in certain cases has enabled companies to use pension
plans as a source for low-cost equity finance. The potential advantages of definedcontribution benefit plans to corporations can be summarized as follows:
1. Ability to use pension plan as a source of corporate equity.
2. Favorable tax policies associated with initial funding and maintenance of the
plan.
3. Tax-free distribution of dividends.
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Another issue that is important to note is that defined-contribution pension plans
can provide a corporation with protection from an unwanted buyout or takeover. When
employees hold a significant amount of company stock, it is more difficult for outsiders
who wish to obtain a significant equity position in the company.
The ESOP, the Section 401K Plan, ESPP, Stock Option Plans, Individual Equity
Plans
Now we are ready to look more carefully at the specific features of the definedcontribution pension plans. On the first criteria, regarding the availability of an equity
building opportunity for the largest possible number of employees, the ESOP, the ESPP,
and the Section 401K Plan provide an opportunity for everyone to participate. The
National Employee Ownership Center specifies that the ESOP must include everyone
who has worked for 1,000 hours in a 12-month period; the Section 401K Plan is also
available to all employees that meet age and service requirements. Employees who have
been at a company for over 2 years can participate in an ESPP. Stock options and
Individual Equity Plans are most often selected offerings used as incentives for primarily
senior-level employees. (Rosen, 2002).
Within the plans that are made universally available, including the ESOP, the
ESPP, and the Section 401K Plan, the ESOP is the only plan where the individual has no
personal equity at stake. In an ESOP, the company contributes the stock to employees;
very rarely does an employee purchase any stock. Conversely, an ESPP always requires
employees to purchase the company stock, at a discount. While a Stock Option program
also requires the employee to purchase the stock, she only does so in an environment
where the market price covers the cost of the option, thus guaranteeing a return. The
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401K is funded by employee equity in the form of payroll deductions, which are matched
in varying degrees depending upon employer policy.
Now that we have covered the straightforward subjects of “who qualifies” and
“who contributes”, we move to the complicated matter of how to best align productivity
with reward. How does one determine who contributes more or most to company
productivity? Is productivity effectively captured by considering relative wage levels?
Do other factors matter, like years at the company, or critical nature/difficulty of the job
performed?
The deliberation looks a bit like the traditional diamond/water paradox. Good
management, like the diamond, is assumed to be rarer than labor, thus explaining the pay
premium. But without labor, the necessity of which is akin to water, there would be no
product or service to manage; yet a potentially large army of the unemployed, in as great
a supply as water, never to be exhausted, reduces both its price and its value.
Neoclassical economics values employees by the marginal product of their labor.
In a production environment, it is straightforward to measure the product of labor in
terms of output generation. It is much more difficult to determine the marginal product
of labor in the management realm, where revenue generated, customers retained,
expenses minimized, shareholder value created, or deadlines met provide a yardstick, but
one not always directly attributable to the individual.
Stock options and the issuance of restricted stock most often distribute the gains
from productivity to the “diamonds”, or a select group of management-level employees.
These plans frequently bank on future productivity, given that they are often used as
incentives to either attract or retain talent. Identified as contributors to the oft-cited
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concern of grossly inflated of executive pay, stock options and the issuance of restricted
stock have been associated with the increasing income disparity. These instruments have
also been subject to abuse, in that they can be used to circumvent executive compensation
policies, or to obfuscate the reality of a corporation’s financial condition by recognizing
compensation liabilities off of the corporate balance sheet. These incentives have also
been accused of perversely rewarding executives for short-term productivity at the
expense of long-term corporate viability, as “cashing out” becomes the objective.
While Stock Options and other Individual Equity Plans most often selectively
distribute productivity gains to management in particular, the Section 401K Plan
distributes productivity gains based upon wage level. Given that the contributions to the
Section 401K Plan are a flat percentage of total wages, the larger the wage, the larger the
employer match. The ESPP does not take productivity into consideration at all, as every
employee is entitled to purchase stock in the same amount, at the same time, at the same
price.
The ESOP allocations are made without an industry standard or formula, relying
fully on the discretion and judgment of management. In the article titled “A Brief
Overview of Employee Ownership in the U.S.”, it is noted that “allocations are made on
the basis of relative pay or some more equitable formula.” (National Center For
Employee Ownership (NCEO), 2009, p. 1). If this discretion is executed with care and
stewardship, it is possible that contribution to productivity could be more equitably and
realistically measured, by taking into account other influencing factors such as loyalty,
experience, growth and development. It is worth further investigation how shares might
be fairly granted to employees for generating new ideas, products, and markets, or to
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those that find ways to improve production techniques or administrative processes.
Expanding the idea of stock grants to encompass more than a provision of incentives for
senior executives to meet revenue and profit targets could be a beneficial strategy for
both employees and employers.
At this point in the paper, I am able to narrow the focus, given the initial set of
criteria that I have established. It has been noted that Stock Options and Individual
Equity Plans do not in their current form offer the opportunity to build equity for a
substantial and diverse employee population. Therefore, at this juncture, they do not fit
into the purpose of this particular paper, which is to underscore the importance of
expanding asset-building opportunities and to highlight the most effective and practical
tools that can be used to accomplish the task.. The ESPP can also be placed on the
sidelines, given that another significant focus of this paper is to correlate asset-building
with productivity, and the ESPP is not designed to accomplish this task. Additional
research on these particular stock-based plans must be left as a tangential, nevertheless
important future endeavor.
Although it is already questionable as to whether the Section 401K Plan has any
special effect upon asset accessibility or productivity, I will continue to look more closely
at this type of account for other reasons. Specifically as it relates to both the ESOP and
Section 401K Plan, I will cover the issue of asset building and uncertainty in equity
markets, in situations where there is no diversification mandate.
Comparison between the ESOP and the Section 401K Plan.
The next step is evaluating the criteria of having the ability to sell company stock
for a market price that is fair and equitable. This consideration highlights the potential
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dangers of pension plans that are heavily weighted in company stock. The worse case
scenario happens when the employee uses savings to buy into a pension plan with a large
percentage invested in company stock, a situation that by nature lacks the investment
diversity to minimize risk. Furthermore, there are restrictions in the plan preventing the
employee from selling the stock. If the company or the stock price falters, the risk to the
employee is two-fold; she could be stuck with de-valued stock and find herself without a
job. She may have also substituted a maximum contribution to a Section 401K Plan for
savings or other investment.
If a company is publicly-traded, a turn in the news or sentiment regarding an
individual company stock can be deleterious to an employee’s account. In Wang’s article
of 2002 addressing problems associated with the Section 401K Plan, she has the
following comment: “Studies have shown that though overall market risk has stayed
relatively constant, individual stock volatility — which stems from company-specific
events — has more than doubled over the past 30 years. In reality, the evidence for
wealth building is mixed at best.” She continues to say that “On average the typical
401(k) company stock delivers a return in line with the S&P 500’s — but at aboveaverage risk. For every big gainer like Citigroup (up 94 percent over the past three
years), there has been a disaster like Owens-Corning (down 95 percent). This conclusion
made in 2002 has special irony, in that Citigroup’s stock performance validated Wang’s
concern by falling over 95 percent over the past few years. (Wang, 2002).
Although the Section 401K Plan does not have to have a majority of its assets
invested in company stock, this is often the case, given that matches of company stock
made in employee accounts enjoy favorable tax treatment. This is what happened in the
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well-known case of Enron, where Martine Costello’s article in CNN Money titled The
“Enron Problem” points out that 58% of the Enron 401K was invested in company stock.
(Costello, 2002).
Some argue that cases like Enron are rare. In Costello’s 2002 article, David
Wray, president of the Profit sharing/401(k) Council, comments that “most companies
don’t go bankrupt, and the stock has value in the long term” (Costello, 2002, p.1). This
perspective has gained some credence in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, given
the significant stock market rebound. It is possible that the preservation of stock market
values has become so politically important that interventions will be always be made to
prop up values. Nevertheless, Citigroup stock is still languishing in 2010, and Bear
Stearns, like Enron, declared bankruptcy. In the case of Bear Stearns, employee equity
was wiped out, and the fiduciary may face litigation.
The pension plan fiduciary is charged with protecting the employee’s financial
interests. If there is negative information that leads the fiduciary to believe that the value
of the stock is going to be significantly impacted, the fiduciary is charged to act. But,
there is an inherent conflict of interest because the fiduciary is most often employed by
the company.
Offsetting this risk to a certain extent are structural aspects of the ESOP that are
not characteristic of the Section 401K Plan heavily weighted in company stock. The
most important factor mitigating ESOP risk is the likelihood that the ESOP employee has
not contributed her own savings to fund the pension plan. In contrast, the Section 401K
Plan requires funding by the employee, with the employer providing only the matching
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portion of the account. Therefore, the Section 401K Plan places the employee’s personal
contribution at stake.
Another structural quality of the ESOP that mitigates risk is the fact that most
ESOP’s reside within privately-held corporations, with Rosen (2008) noting that 90% of
ESOP’s are held in private corporations. (Rosen, 2008). Because the value of most
ESOP’s are not determined in publicly-traded markets, speculative risk is minimized. In
the event that the ESOP does reside in a publicly-traded corporation, it is possible that
employee ownership is positively correlated with stock price. As referenced by the
National Center for Employee Ownership, a study completed by American Capital
Strategies in 1995 found that in public companies where employees owned over 10% of
the corporation, “these companies consistently outperformed the broader market indexes”
(National Center for Employee Ownership, 2010, p. 2).
Another factor that mitigates ESOP risk is the increased likelihood that ESOP
companies, relative to non-ESOP companies, will augment their retirement plans with
offerings that are not tied to company stock. Research conducted in 2001 by Douglas
Kruse and Joseph Blasi of Rutgers University and referenced by Rosen (2002) found the
following to be true: in ESOP companies, defined benefit plans are offered 30.1% of the
time, whereas in non-ESOP companies this employee benefit is offered in only 4.9% of
the cases. The same study found that the ESOP companies were more generous in
offering all types of retirement plans. ESOP’s offered non-401(k) profit sharing 35.7%
of the time, relative to the non-ESOP companies in 8.0% of instances. ESOP companies
had a 401(k) 33.3%, whereas non-ESOP companies offered it 6.2% of the time. Other
defined contribution plans were offered 14.7% of the time in ESOP companies, and 2.3%
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in non-ESOP corporations. (Rosen, 2002, p. 2). This same research concluded that
ESOP participants accumulate on average three times more value in their retirement plans
than non-ESOP plan participants. (Rosen, 2002, p.2).
In ESOP companies, do employees give up wages for these benefits? Research
shows this is not the case in all but 1% of the companies studied by a group at
Washington State University. This study, quoted by Rosen in 2002, found that ESOP’s
on average paid wages 12% higher, and a median wages 8% higher, than the control
companies studied. (Rosen, 2002, p. 2).
The most important distinction that mitigates risk and builds long-term employee
equity is the nature of the ESOP to operate not just as a pension plan or an employee
benefit, but as structural means of facilitating employee inclusion. When its full effect is
harnessed, the ESOP transfers ownership both in a financial and cultural sense. The
Democracy Collaborative at the University of Maryland (2005) provides the following
assessment of the ESOP “ownership culture”:
ESOP’s that have adopted it (the ownership culture) have made significant
changes in the way they do business. Although these changes often fall short of
work-place democracy, this sector of the ESOP world has succeeded in increasing
worker participation, further raising productivity and helping stabilize jobs and
community in the process (The Democracy Collaborative at the University of
Maryland, 2005, p. 59).
Specifically regarding the reference to ESOP’s and their positive effect upon job
stabilization, the Democracy Collaborative is referring to the requirement that ESOP
companies buy-out the ownership stakes of terminated employees. Therefore, a decision
on the part of an ESOP company to close a plant or layoff employees is not to be taken
lightly.
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When an ESOP company makes significant company decisions about subjects
like plant closings or layoffs, employees have a say in the matter. This right to
“participate” is mandated within ERISA. When shareholders are voting on “major
issues” such as closings and mergers, ESOP plan participants can instruct their pension
trustee how to vote on the issue. (The Democracy Collaborative, 2005, p. 60). The
Democracy Collaborative (2005) has found that many ESOP corporations are taking the
concept of participation to an even higher level, by having employee representatives on
corporate boards. Even though this representation is not mandated by ERISA, 21% of
ESOP companies in the year 2000 had an employee representative on the board. (The
Democracy Collaborative, 2005). It would be interesting to know how many companies
have an employee board representative in 2010.
It is important to recognize, however, that having representation or a voting
interest is only one aspect of participation. Participation also means the desire and the
ability to engage at various levels within the corporation. In ESOP companies, or any
company for that matter, observable organizational forms are an indication of levels of
involvement or engagement. The National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) in
its article titled “A Guide to Doing Research on Employee Ownership” notes that “high
involvement companies would be likely to employ such practices as self-managing
teams, open book management, and cross-functional teams.” The article makes the
following conclusion that “the more ownership and the more involvement, the better the
results tend to be” (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2010, p.1).
Undoubtedly, the organizational structure of a corporation is one dimension that
can make employee participation at all levels more natural. Corporate structure,
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however, can not unilaterally foster a genuine ownership culture; creation of this
atmosphere is predicated upon the open-minded attitudes of the part of both employees
and management. If the relationships between either functional groups or individuals in
the company are more adversarial than cooperative, more compartmentalized than
expansive, it is difficult for the representation that is mandated within ERISA to manifest
itself in the kind of participation that makes a positive impact on the bottom line.
United Airlines, one of the most famous ESOP conversions, is a textbook
example of this type of behavior. Pilots protected the interest of pilots, flight attendants
took care of flight attendants. ESOP companies that demonstrate the largest gains in
productivity are the ones where employees don’t solely think like, or just relate to, their
own “group”, be it pilots, engineers, or shop floor technicians. Rather, they interact as
owners with the common goal of making the company successful.
The United Airlines ESOP also had a higher probability of failing, given that the
change of control was made when the company was experiencing severe financial
problems. This is one major reason that corporations have adopted an ESOP structure in
the past, in order to avoid the possibility of bankruptcy. If the ESOP fails in this instance,
is it difficult to make the case that the situation is worse than it would have been if the
company had failed in the first place, especially if the consideration is made that the
employee has not put up any personal equity to buy company stock. One perspective on
the situation is that a bankruptcy-avoidance ESOP at the very least buys its employees
some time. (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2009).
Neoclassical economics might say that the fundamental premise of the ESOP is
flawed, if its success is predicated upon the presence of relationships that have an
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altruistic quality. Even if we assume that relationships that are more cooperative than
competitive are not realistic or “normal”, it is important to remember that the ESOP does
promote self-interest, which is embodied in the corporate contribution of stock to its
employees. Studies do corroborate that the financial incentive is a powerful one, in that
productivity is positively correlated with larger employee ownership holdings. There is
also a reinforcing element in that employee participation increases when employees own
a larger percentage of the corporation.
The conclusion is that productivity flourishes where material employee ownership
is accompanied by a representative, participative organizational structure and culture. It
is an encouraging sign that recent statistics published by Rosen (2008) show employees
as majority owners in 40% of ESOP’s, a number which reflects a growing trend toward
majority ownership. Although employees in large, public companies with ESOP’s most
often do not own enough stock to gain a sense of ownership, these plans are in the
minority, constituting only 10% of ESOP’s. (Rosen, 2008, p.3).
The presence of an ownership culture is a serious point of distinction between the
Section 401K Plan heavily weighted in company stock and the ESOP. One significant
advantage of an ESOP with an ownership culture is the increased likelihood that
management will give employees more access to company information. Even in the
instances where open book management is not standard practice, employee engagement
and participation fosters transparency. In the past, it has been a lack of transparency that
has enabled corporate management in cases like Enron to mislead investors and
employees about the financial condition of the corporation.
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When management and labor are aligned in purpose—to create shared value
within the corporation—energy is expended in pursuing common goals. This internal
alignment is all the more important if the ESOP is being used as a source of equity
finance. Outside finance naturally has a different understanding and set of objectives
than internally-provided equity. Most often, outside finance will have limited
understanding of corporate dynamics and industry particulars, with emphasis placed
predominantly upon meeting short-term revenue goals. The long-term viability and
prosperity of the company may not even be the objective of external finance, which in
some cases may financially benefit more by ultimately taking over a company.
From a corporate perspective, the condition that makes the ESOP most attractive
as a corporate finance tool is the tax deductibility of both principal and interest when the
ESOP is used to obtain a loan. “For many companies, this is an excellent strategy for
corporate financing and can cut borrowing costs by one-third.” (Employee Stock
Ownership Plans, 2009, p.2). “The company may then use the proceeds for any
acceptable business purpose such as purchasing equipment, buying another company,
taking a private company public, or financing the sale of the stock.” (Employee Stock
Ownership Plans, 2009, p.3). No other stock incentive plans have this feature.
The other favorable aspect of the ESOP regarding tax policy is the ability for the
plan to distribute dividends to plan participants tax-free. This provision alone can have
an exceptionally positive effect upon corporate earnings. The recognition of this benefit
has spurred further financial innovations, most notably in the form of the KSOP, or an
ESOP within a 401K. This move is largely transparent to the employee, who often does
not even realize that a change has occurred. The ability of a 401(k) to masquerade as an
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ESOP, qualifying for ESOP-like incentives without making the same level of
contribution that is made by an ESOP company has been an area of concern in the past.
To address any free rider issues, clarity in making distinctions between financial
instruments is critical. It is important to remember that ESOP companies meet special
requirements to qualify for the incentives created within ERISA. With the typical ESOP
employee’s retirement plan three times larger than that of the non-ESOP employee, the
argument can be made that these incentives do in fact directly benefit employees.
A Closing Word on Defined-benefit and Defined-contribution Plans
It is true that even though an employee has an opportunity to build assets in any
defined-contribution plan, there are risks and concerns. It is not a sure thing like a
defined-benefit plan payout. In the long term, however, I find that the plan which is most
congruent with an overall emphasis on asset building is one that can capture each
employee’s contribution to productivity in a negotiable asset that holds fundamental, not
just speculative value. This is most feasible in a privately-held corporation, where the
market for stock is limited to those who are actually involved in the operations of the
company. In this case, the value of the stock should more closely resemble the realities
of the business.
A private company also has an advantage in that it is more likely to be of the size
and scale where an individual’s contribution to productivity can be more clearly
understood, rewarded, and harnessed. It is also in this environment where a dearth of
equity finance is both demonstrable and detrimental. Without access to capital for
expansionary purposes, a company is thwarted in making its greatest contribution to its
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current and future employees, and the economy at large. It is here where the ESOP most
clearly demonstrates its elegance.
Now we finish the section on corporate-sponsored benefit programs that offer
employees and employers the opportunity to recognize contributions to productivity in
the allocation of assets. After various equity-oriented financial instruments were
examined, the ESOP garnered the major focus. In the next few sections, I will examine
the methods that make corporate ownership available to all identified stakeholders. In the
process, well-recognized methods that are currently being employed are examined.
Additionally, new approaches that have been proposed but yet to be implemented will be
considered. It will not come as a surprise to the reader that financial instruments
evolving out of the ESOP will be a significant part of the discussion.
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Chapter Six: Corporate-sponsored Benefit plans and Customer Ownership
The ESOP Modified to be a CSOP (Customer Stock Ownership Plan)
Conceptually and logistically, the basic idea and structure of the ESOP can be
expanded for use in many other applications. One application is the distribution of
corporate ownership not just to employees, but to other stakeholders of a company,
including customers and consumers. As with the ESOP, this ownership stake offered the
corporation a primary source for low-cost equity finance.
It was Louis Kelso, the inventor of the ESOP, who specifically broadened its
application to include the CSOP, or a Customer Stock Ownership Plan. As documented
by the Kelso Institute, the first use of the CSOP was in 1958, when it successfully
enabled a group of farmers in California’s central valley to buy out a key supplier, Valley
Nitrogen Producers.
Although the CSOP can be tactically used to transfer ownership of a corporation
to its stakeholders, it does not have the status within the Federal government or the IRS
like the ESOP. Because it does not enjoy the same favorable tax treatment, it is not well
recognized like the ESOP.
Although the original use of the CSOP was as a leveraged buyout instrument,
Kelso anticipated that it would be used in a much larger context. Kelso visualized that
the consuming public could both finance and own part or all of the companies that
provided their goods and services. Corporations could facilitate this expanded ownership
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operation by using financial tools the built upon the framework of the ESOP. Clearly,
Kelso had a plethora of ideas grounded in the use of various innovative financial
instruments, and he spent a lifetime developing these concepts. Since his death, the
communication, advocacy and development of Kelso’s work has become the labor of the
Center for Economic and Social Justice (CESJ), where much of the information in this
paper about the ESOP and related financial instruments has been obtained.
Kelso’s intent for the CSOP was philosophically and functionally very similar to
that of the ESOP. His fundamental thought process was that business relationships,
either between employer and employee, or producer and consumer, can be very
synergistic. In the case of the ESOP, if employees experience direct financial benefit
when the company does well, they have a significant incentive to make the company
successful. When the company does well, the employees do well on two fronts--both as
wage earners and investors in the company. As employees, they have made a
commitment to the company, and it is this type of major commitment that makes any
source of finance both available and reliable. It is in the ESOP that the elements of
employment and investment are forged together with a necessary, mutual commitment
between employer and employee. A lack of commitment on either side hurts both
parties.
Advantages of Stakeholder Finance Relative to Traditional Sources of Finance
While employees or customers as investors have automatic incentives to be
committed to the long-term welfare of the corporation, it is the converse with traditional
contemporary finance. As the financial sector increasingly becomes the domain of large
multi-nationals, the incentives to make anything more than a short-term commitment
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diminish. The magnitude of these organizations increases the likelihood of strict
constraints and standardized operating procedures. These automated responses, which
often include uniformly calling in existing loans and restricting all lending in a downturn,
translate into pro-cyclical, contractionary policy. Direct government action is then
triggered to augment the negative effects.
If business cycles are viewed as natural phenomenon, it is to be expected that all
businesses will be less liquid at certain points in time. When a downturn would
otherwise have been temporary, the actions of finance have the potential to force defaults
that would have otherwise not occurred. This response can turn the downside of a
business cycle into a crisis, similar to what has been commonly observed during the
global financial crisis that started in 2007. This perspective regarding economic crisis
has recently gained more credence. A Wall Street Journal cover page article authored by
Lahart (2007) documents new-found interest in Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability
Hypothesis, which argues that this downward spiral will take place. (Lahart, 2007).
It is reasonable to expect that an employee as investor would be less likely to
overreact or overcorrect than a capital provider from the outside. Employees,
unconstrained by standard operating investment procedure, would conceivably have the
benefit of insider knowledge, coupled with a longer investment horizon. This perspective
could be especially beneficial in labor negotiations, where wage concessions in a
downturn could be guaranteed payback in the future, out of profits generated during a
recovery.
The customer as financier could be expected to act in a similar partnershiporiented fashion, especially if limited substitutes are available in the marketplace. In the
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event that customer and company were to reside in the same community, the incentives to
cooperate financially would be even more powerful.
Other Benefits Offered by the CSOP and Customer Ownership in General
Customer ownership from a corporate perspective.
The loyalty of the consumer as investor has impact both in the capital and
consumption realms. Every time the product or service was consumed, there would be a
dual benefit for the customer, both on the consumption and investment sides of the
equation. While loyal employees increase the marginal productivity of labor, or the cost
side of the equation, customer loyalty positively impacts the revenue side, where
customer ownership may result in less price sensitivity and/or more consumption.
When companies have customers as owners, the relationship between the
company and the customer deepens. A closer relationship is financially beneficial to the
corporation on multiple fronts, with an especially important one being product
development. Companies already want to get closer to customers, so that they can tailor
products and services to their customer’s needs and wants. But to have customers
invested in the innovation and development cycle of the company, as committed early
adapters, is a key competitive advantage. Furthermore, in owning a part of the company,
customers become more easily retained throughout the entire product lifecycle, which is
by nature a bumpy ride.
Customer ownership from a customer perspective.
Up to this point, we have discussed the advantages of the CSOP predominantly
from the corporate perspective. The argument to be made from the customer’s
perspective is not as compelling, because a fundamental aspect of the ESOP, namely that
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it is recognized and supported by IRS policy, is not the case with the CSOP.
Corporations get favorable tax treatment for funding an ESOP with contributions of stock
to employees. This is why it is very rare to see an ESOP where the employee buys stock
to participate.
With the CSOP, there is no incentive to contribute stock to customers. Even the
employer tax benefit associated with the 401(k), the ability to do tax-free matching of
company stock, is not available to the CSOP. The net result is that unlike the ESOP, the
CSOP in its current iteration is not a source of credit, because the customer has to raise
equity to participate. Nevertheless, the absence of specific financial incentives does
nothing to prevent customers from buying stock on the open market if the business
partner company is public.
Today’s Alternative to the CSOP—the Direct Public Offering
In the event that the company is private, customers can participate in ownership
via the financial instrument termed a direct public offering. In a direct public offering,
customers or consumers are given a special opportunity to purchase stock ownership in a
corporation. This purchase opportunity is not offered to the general public through the
traditional Wall Street public-equity markets, therefore it is termed “direct”. The
prospects are qualified with the criteria that participants must be true stakeholders. Thus,
the potential problem of owners creating anti-competitive effects is averted.
By floating a direct public offering, a company can raise equity capital directly
from those who already consume the good or service, or are stakeholders of the company.
As with the ESOP, this source of equity finance brings capital that should be reasonably
committed to the long-term well being of the company. Again, the customer and
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company are positively linked in a cooperative financial relationship, made stronger if the
customer and company are in the same geographic area and the product or service is has
few substitutes.
Drew Field, an industry specialist in the direct public offering area, nicely sums
up the benefits of the direct public offering on his dfdpo.com website: with publiclytraded shares, the business is “owned by customers of securities firms”. “With increasing
financialization of investments, these owners may have no interest in the business, its
markets, products, services, local economy or management — their only interest is in an
expected short-term increase in the security’s price.” (Field, p.1).
Pearson also makes the connection between a direct public offering and the
microcredit model pioneered outside the United States. In the “initial microcredit model,
Grameen Bank, founded by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, required a borrower to be
in a community of about five other borrowers, with responsibilities to each other. After
the start-up or seed capital stage, the next level for growing businesses is to expand its
community of owners to customers, neighbors, vendors, employees and others who
believe in what the business is doing.” (Field, p. 1).
Like the ESOP, the direct public offering is a successful, working model. It is a
financial vehicle that enables companies to raise low-cost capital, while providing
customers with the opportunity to reap financial rewards that would otherwise be
reserved for institutional investors. Unlike the CSOP as proposed, however, the direct
public offering does not have a means for a customer without savings or foundational
assets to participate. Nor does the direct public offering have the special ESOP-like tax
treatment, with its powerful set of corporate incentives.
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Although the direct public offering as it is implemented today provides clear and
distinct benefits to corporations, the CSOP is a conceptual model that incorporates tax
incentives making customer finance as desirable as the ESOP. Because corporations
habitually approach Wall Street to raise capital, using alternative methods of raising
capital requires a major change of attitude and behavior, even in the event that the
associated costs are lower, and the likelihood of actually obtaining finance capital is
higher. Migration of the direct public offering to an IRS-qualified CSOP-like plan would
make this approach even more desirable, giving it additional traction and scalability so
that more widespread adoption can occur.
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Chapter Seven: Ownership of Natural Monopolies and Regulated Industry
An Opportunity to Participate Becomes a Right to Participate
In the prior chapter we covered the financial instruments that corporations can use
to raise equity capital, while at the same time building assets for its employees and
customers. Regarding both the ESOP and the other employee pension plans,
participation in ownership, or the sharing of profits and financial benefits, has been
justified on the basis of contribution to productivity. In the case of the CSOP, the
customer relationship is reason enough for participation; yet, any special treatment or
recognition of the CSOP would also involve justification through contribution--to sales,
revenue, and overall company success.
Now we turn our attention to applying asset distribution methods that apply to the
development, ownership, and direct financial benefit associated with goods and services
that are naturally monopolistic or delivered through regulated industries. Whereas the
ownership of assets up to this point has been discussed within the context of contributions
to productivity, these goods and services present a new dimension to the argument.
Community ownership of the commons, including the land, resources and infrastructure
that provide for the basic needs of everyone within a community, recognizes that citizens,
community members, and taxpayers can improve economic efficiency by directly
participating in the creation of value. Sharing assets that are developed with the
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participation of the community provides the incentive to participate, where there is
financially-oriented reward.
Unless participation is made mandatory, however, not all community members
will participate or contribute to the process. This brings up the point that there are
situations where the right to ownership can be more clearly justified, without the litmus
test of participation and contribution. Passive ownership is about fairness; community
ownership with participation encompasses the principles of efficiency and fairness.
Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney (2004) identify natural monopolies and regulated
industries as attractive opportunities for community member ownership, specifically
mentioning electric utilities, mass transit and cable systems (Kurland Brohawn, and
Greaney, 2004). In these industries, there are a limited number of private, public, or
cooperative providers that are granted a license, operations agreement, or land use
contract.
In these particular examples, government intervention and participation on some
level is operationally necessary. Because monopoly industries lack the natural market
incentives that drive efficiency and quality, government imposes rules and standards. A
major efficiency-related problem in these markets is price distortion. Some of these
markets operate like set-aside contracts, with little or no competition. To preserve the
interests of the consumer, government counteracts monopoly profit-taking. Other
monopoly markets provide services that can not be financially supported in traditional
markets. In this case, government subsidized service to guarantee access.
The important distinction in these industries is the presence of active government
intervention. Through its government, the public is directly involved in its provision of
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financial support. This current involvement strengthens the justification for public
ownership.
I suggest that other types of government-provided infrastructure are good
candidates, including water, garbage, sewage and other recycling systems. Other
excellent candidates include green projects and clean energy, where government is
currently providing financial incentives or subsidies.
In some cases, especially in the electricity market, stakeholder ownership already
exists. It is the cooperative form of ownership that has given community members, as
customers of a particular enterprise, this opportunity.
The consumer cooperative.
The consumer cooperative is an enterprise that disperses pre-tax profits, or surplus
earnings, to its customers. Each consumer receives a rebate, the size of which is
determined by consumption; the larger the usage, the larger the rebate. Although the
cooperative does not pay taxes on these allocations, the individual beneficiaries are
subject to personal income taxes.
When extended product or service provision is required to meet the needs of a
particular customer, this customer is often required to provide the capital for the
expansion. This capital is used to develop a product, service, or network that will be
made available not only to the customer demanding and paying for it today, but to anyone
who needs it in the future. This up-front cost incurred by the customer, used in the
development of a natural monopoly or good/service that can be accessed by all, is
returned in rebates over time.
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A well-known example of this practice is the rural electric cooperative, which was
created during President Roosevelt’s tenure as a means of providing electricity to
underserved rural communities. The Alaskan pipeline is another example.
While the cooperative structure effectively distributes profits to stakeholders, it is
missing a fundamental component of the ESOP-like financial approach—the ability to
directly link ownership with capital investment and expansion. To accomplish this task,
a CSOP could be implemented.
The CSOP with an Expanded Role.
Expanding the earlier conception of the CSOP, Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney
(2004) offer the following definition of the CSOP:
An expanded capital ownership vehicle for providing self-liquidating, productive
credit to the regular customers of public utilities, marketing cooperatives, mass
transit systems, family health care system(s), etc., linking them as owners to the
enterprise’s future investment opportunities and capital growth. For her
patronage, the regular customer would get back ownership rights, represented by
shares released to her CSOP account as the CSOP’s debt is repaid with pre-tax
earnings paid in the form of tax-deductible dividends on CSOP-held shares.
Released shares would be allocated among users according to their relative
patronage of the system. Future dividends on CSOP stock would be used to offset
each user’s monthly bill. The CSOP would also create an internal market for
repurchasing shares when there is no public market for the shares (Kurland,
Brohawn, and Greaney, p. 124, 2004).
The new elements added to this iteration include the allocation of shares is
dependent upon usage, and the distribution of the proceeds used as an offset to
consumption. If the CSOP were to obtain preferable tax treatment like the ESOP, the
distributions, like dividends, would be tax free.
Like the cooperative, the CSOP distributes financial gains to community
members, who as customers, purchase public goods and services. Different than the
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consumer cooperative structure rooted in consumption and designed to recover costs
incurred by customers financing expansion, the CSOP is an investment vehicle for all
stakeholders affected by the enterprise. Within the CSOP, a stakeholder can be a
customer, supplier, provider, producer, employee, or community member. Because the
CSOP is flexible enough to accommodate a diverse range of constituents, it can be
applied in a variety of situations.
The CSOP is more than customer ownership.
One will notice that in the legal description of the CSOP, there is a reference
made to “family health care systems” as one type of application for the CSOP. School
systems have been discussed as well. Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney (2004) provide
more detail:
CSOP’s could also be combined with ESOP’s for establishing for-profit
comprehensive health care delivery systems whose ownership and control would
be shared by all doctors, other healthcare providers and employees and
subscribers, supplemented by health care vouchers for subscribers with incomes
below the poverty line. For-profit educational systems owned by teachers, other
school employees, and parent-subscribers, could be similarly financed and
organized (Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney, 2004, p. 37).
Goods and services that are needed or consumed by all, especially in the cases
where the current systems have been challenged to deliver quality service at a costjustifiable price, are all areas of opportunity for the CSOP. Regarding the delivery of
critical public services, the CSOP solves a common problem by mitigating the tension
between those who strongly favor either a private or a public solution, where each side
perceives that the answer is all or nothing. The CSOP focuses consumers on the
arrangements that deliver the best quality of service, which may well be a hybrid set of
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providers. Consumers as owners also have the incentive to manage costs, which can be
significantly impacted when the system is used prudently.
It was proposed in the early discussions regarding health care reform that
cooperatives be central in the delivery of health care. Neither the pro-government nor
pro-business lobbies were proponents, because neither type of competing bureaucratic
form stood to uniquely benefit from the cooperative approach. Although both the
cooperative and the CSOP are corporations, their internal power structure is necessarily
altered to give the consumer both a stake and a voice. In the cooperative, it is one person,
one vote; in the CSOP, it is a representative form of corporate governance that mirrors
the ESOP.
Today there are already consumer cooperatives that deliver health care and other
public services. The difference is that cooperatives don’t have the corporate-level tax
advantages that contemporary ESOP’s enjoy. Therefore, the cooperative is unable to
finance investment with future earnings, and is also denied the tax deductibility of both
principal and interest. If the CSOP can adopt the legal status of the ESOP, capital credit
will be more readily available and cost effective, for both initially funding the stock
ownership plan and satisfying the need for future expansion.
Legal recognition is certainly a critical factor if the CSOP, or any ESOP-like
financial structure, is to be adopted in the community realm. In this community domain,
there is another ESOP-like financial instrument that has been proposed but is yet to be
formally recognized. Whereas the CSOP is designed to democratically distribute the
financial gains from the use and operation of public goods and services, the CIC, or
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Community Investment Corporation, is designed to share the profit from new
development with the community.
Stakeholder Ownership of Land and Development
The CIC (Community Investment Corporation).
Whereas the CSOP is especially useful in spreading ownership to customers of
natural utilities or to providers and consumers of essential services like health care and
education, the CIC addresses the ownership of land and property. Property development
that occurs on publicly-owned land, or receives public subsidy such as TIF (Tax
Increment Financing) dollars is an ideal candidate for the CIC.
The CIC is a corporate structure that facilitates shared financial ownership,
allowing constituents and future residential and commercial occupants to invest in
development together. The assumption of the CIC is that tenants and community
members have a natural stake in the investment. The stake of community members is
validated because the project involves, or requires, public participation. This
participation can be observed in developer tax breaks, economic subsidies, or in a public
good claim to the land. Future residential or commercial occupants have a vested interest
in the property as users of the development. If commercial tenants are businesses that
serve the community, customers benefit as owners also.
The definition of the CIC, according to Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney (2004) is
a “for-profit land planner and private sector real estate developer geared to rational
innovation and change at the community level” (Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney, 2004,
p. 36). The goal of the CIC is to benefit the community on two levels. First, the
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community has a say in how the land is developed, and the community has a voice in
determining what types of goods and services are provided in the development.
From a legal perspective, the idea for the CIC comes out of Revenue Act of 1978.
Added as Subchapter U within this legislation, the GSOC (General Stock Ownership
Corporation) forms the legal underpinnings of the CIC. Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney
(2004) write about the difficulty of adopting the GSOC framework, writing that “(a)s
enacted, all citizens of a State could become stockholders of such massive projects as the
Alaskan gas pipeline. Subchapter U proved so unwieldy that no State adopted a GSOC
despite its many attractive ownership incentives. (Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney,
2004, p. 37).
Because the legal provisions that activate the CIC have yet to be adopted at the
state level, the predominant community development model is the Community
Development Corporation (CDC).
The CDC (Community Development Corporation)
The key organizational distinction between the CDC and the CIC is that the CDC
is a not-for-profit entity, thus it does not offer the opportunity for equity participation.
The Democracy Collaborative(2005) provides the following definition of the CDC:
Community Development Corporations are typically neighborhood-based,
501I(3) non-profit corporations—with a board composed of at least one-third
community residents—that promote the improvement of the physical and social
infrastructures in neighborhoods with populations significantly below the are
median income (The Democracy Collaborative, 2005, p. 26).
The genesis of the CDC was as an affordable housing developer in blighted urban
areas. This mission has expanded to include development of infrastructure and services,
including job training facilities, shopping centers, health care facilities and day care
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centers. By attracting and funding business enterprises within a community, the CDC
broadens the sales and property tax base, and creates new job opportunities within the
community.
The CDC has been most visible in areas lacking in social and civic institutions, or
where government has not been accountable or effective. In this environment, the CDC
looks like an arm of municipal government. Yet, there is a key distinction: residents
have more democratic control over the CDC than they have in local government, given
that the CDC’s board is composed of at least one-third community residents.
Although some CDC’s actually own businesses and properties, a major source of
funding in the past has been in the form of government subsidy. In some cases, funds
that would otherwise been channeled through government agencies have been redirected
to CDC’s. Christopher Walker of the Urban Development Institute comments that “over
the past 30 years, the most promising alternative model to direct government
administration of community development programs has been that of community
development corporations.” (The Democracy Collaborative, 2005, p. 29). The primary
reason for this optimism has been the increase in housing values that has been observed
in certain markets where CDC’s have been active.
While government funding remains an important component of the CDC model,
private funding has been rapidly increasing, which has culminated in better overall
capitalization for CDC’s. According to the Democracy Collaborative (2005), securing
additional private funding has qualified CDC’s for tax breaks created by the New Market
Tax Credits Bill. This legislation gives CDC’s the ability to sell tax credits similar to
those offered by the Low Income Housing Tax Credit. The Democracy Collaborative
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(2005) concludes that these tax credits have increased CDC affordable housing
development in markets where future residents earn 50-80% of the AMI (Area Median
Income). Nevertheless, this model has been less effective in generating CDC-developed
housing for potential residents earning less than 30% AMI. Within this seriously
underserved market, there are only 43 units for every 100 people. (The Democracy
Collaborative, 2005, p. 31).
For CDC’s to be successful in the residential and commercial property
development business, they must work with a variety of constituents, including private
developers and local government. In developing these partnerships, many CDC’s have
become involved in political activism and community organizing. While these efforts
have built the financial base and created business opportunities, it is a delicate balance.
Even though the CDC’s express purpose is to serve the best interest of the community by
listening to its members and responding to their needs, the CDC can only fulfill these
needs by assembling resources from a multitude of areas. How these partnerships are
forged determines how the participants are compensated and ultimately the benefit that
the community receives. Navigating the competing priorities in these arenas of political
and private action is the role of CDC, as an organization positioned to be a powerful
intermediary.
Contrasting the CIC with the CDC.
The CIC is a very different organizational structure from the CDC, given that it is
owned by the community. The developer is the community; the expertise and building
resources are secured in a competitive, rather than a political process. Nevertheless,
fundamental processes like zoning are inevitably political, and property development still
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requires the cooperation of a multitude of participants. The difference though is that the
overarching incentive for the CIC is to both to complete the project and make a profit,
which promotes economic efficiency. Profits are turned into owner’s equity, distributing
a portion of the assets to all individuals that reside within the community. Because future
residents are also homeowners, they participate in the asset distribution as well. Sharing
the equity between the community and the residents provides representation for all
stakeholders, an arrangement that is consistent with concerns about fairness.
To be effective, the CIC must balance the needs of the future residents in the CIC
with the community members that reside in the project area. While profit is one
objective, the current cost of providing services is an equally important consideration.
For example, housing development that meets the needs of the lower end of the AMI
spectrum may not be as profitable as a focusing upon the more financially feasible
projects where CDC’s are most successful, notably the 50-80% AMI resident. But a lack
of housing for certain members of the community is already costing everyone in the
community. If housing is not provided by the CIC, a likely alternative is subsidized
housing which is funded by taxpayers. Subsidized housing is a temporary measure in
comparison, and does little to improve the future prospects of the individual or the quality
of life in the community. Both the CIC and the CDC offer opportunities for individuals
to build assets by owning a home.
Both the CDC and CIC satisfy the demand for housing within a community by
soliciting the input and participation of the community. In the case of the CDC, one-third
of the board that is represented by appointed members of the community. The board of
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the CIC reflects the composition of company ownership; to be an owner, one must have
ties to the community.
With over 4,000 CDC’s in over 50 states, the CDC has proven itself to be an
effective economic development agent. Expanding its reach beyond commercial and
residential real estate development, the CDC has become a community services provider,
where the CDC’s multi-faceted agenda has come to include “anti-crime projects, graffiti
removal, policy advocacy, (and) retail promotion.” (The Democracy Collaborative,
2005, p. 31). Irregardless of the project, its central role is the same: facilitating
public/private partnerships to satisfy collective needs and solve shared problems. First
and foremost it is an institutional framework that distributes assets within the community,
with input and participation from the community. The benefits of these assets are
measured in increased resident retention rates, reduced unemployment, improved school
attendance and performance, and increased availability of goods, services, and housing.
The financial impact is evidenced in the expansion of the tax base.
The CIC is different in that unlike the CDC, it is not an intermediary. The
community works directly with industry to satisfy its needs, and in doing so, it builds
assets that provide direct financial benefit to the community members, as individuals
owning stock in the CIC. The needs of the community are best met when community
members and businesses work effectively together to create the most efficient solutions.
Affordable housing, infrastructure, commercial property and civic improvements are
planned, developed and financed internally, by using the framework of the ESOP.
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In the realm of residential real estate, the CIC is a shared equity model, where
both the community and residents are asset owners. Another shared equity model is the
land trust, the next topic of discussion.
The Community Land Trust—a hybrid solution.
The community land trust (CLT) is a special kind of Real Estate Investment Trust
(REIT). The CLT is like a private community real estate market, where equity gains are
shared in a pre-determined fashion by the homeowner and the trust, thus eliminating
speculative market risk. This shared appreciation is conservative enough to preserve the
affordability for the new owner, while allowing the seller to realize a modest return on
investment.
In the CLT model, the resident owns the mortgage on the house, and the trust
owns the land, which is leased back to the homeowner for a small fee. Because of this
arrangement, the community and homeowner are inextricably linked. Both sides have the
incentive to work with one another, to protect each other’s interests. The commitment
built into this relationship is one reason that the CLT has been successful. For example,
the CLT and homeowner are both involved in the mortgage loan process, ensuring that
the agreement is free of superfluous or egregiously high fees, confusing disclosures, or
other unethical provisions.
Making sure that the mortgage is both a fair and affordable agreement is the first
thing that the CLT and homeowner do together. This financial partnership continues,
however, in that any modification of the original mortgage, in the form of a refinance or
home equity loan, can not be done without the involvement of the CLT. The CLT’s role
is to protect the long-term financial well-being of the home owner. To reduce reliance
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upon second mortgages or home equity loans, some CLT’s make internal funds available
to homeowners for upgrades, expansion, and improvements.
This collaboration between the CLT and the homeowner is one reason that the
rate of foreclosure is so much smaller in the CLT than in the larger population. As
reported by Temple in 2010, research conducted in 2007 concludes that the CLT
homeowner rate of foreclosure is 0.06%, 33 times less than the foreclosure rate for
mortgages in the general population. Temple (2010) attributes 40% of these foreclosures
to a refinance that makes homeownership unaffordable. Homeowners within a CLT must
work closely with CLT management to take out a new or modified loan on their property
(Temple, 2010).
The supporting structure of the CLT, from both a financial and management
perspective, is a private/public partnership. Private financial support of CLT’s is often in
the form of land or real estate that is donated and qualifies for favorable tax treatment in
return. On the public front, CLT’s have multiple sources of finance, including state
government loan programs and federal funding programs like the Neighborhood
Stabilization Program (NSP). Under the auspices of the NSP, CLT’s have worked
directly with homeowners who are facing foreclosure because of an unaffordable
mortgage. The CLT first purchases the home and then sells it back to the homeowner
who takes out a new mortgage that is both traditional and conforming.
The management structure of the CLT reflects this combination of private and
public support and funding. The board is comprised of one-third residents, one-third
community members, and one-third elected or appointed government representatives.

68

The CLT is different from a housing cooperative in this respect, in that all coop board
members are homeowners.
Because the management of the CLT determines market rules, including who
participates in the exchange and the terms of the exchange, the speculative component of
real estate investment is eliminated. Although it is difficult to measure the full effect that
controlling speculative activity in the closed market of the CLT has upon open market
value, a good reference point can be found in the form of property taxes. Higher property
taxes discourage speculative investment, by making it less financially attractive for nonresident investors to purchase real estate. Studies have shown that communities with
higher property taxes have experienced less erosion in residential real estate prices during
the economic crisis, even in communities that have suffered disproportionately higher
losses within industry and employment (Sullivan, p. 3).
Managing the financial risk associated with the real estate transaction is one
reason that CLT’s have helped individuals secure assets safely. One critique of real
estate as a financially beneficial asset-building instrument comes from outside the
transactional aspect of the purchase. In the case of the owner-occupier with few initial
assets, the impact of the living situation—the surrounding environment—is very
important. Securing the best available living situation means being aware of, and
sensitive to, the specific location of the real estate. The conundrum is that the most
affordable real estate is found in the least desirable locations, in marginal neighborhoods.
Because a lack of affordable housing is the primary reason that CLT are formed in the
first place, the CLT most often operates in communities with a naturally favorable
location.
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Living in a desirable area provides access to a set of assets that have long-term
financial impact. These assets often include an effective educational system, developed
physical infrastructure, and the provision of services that maximize health and safety.
These assets are central to the creation of a cohesive community, which bodes well for
both business and personal development. Upward mobility is most often attained through
relationships, through personal connections and networks. Safe and physically appealing
communities make it easier for people to know each other, learn from each other, and
share ideas and information, whereas marginal neighborhoods can close residents off
from one another and the outside world. Residing in a neighborhood with limited
prospects for change and growth diminishes the quality of life today and the future
potential of tomorrow. These negative impacts have the potential to offset equity gains.
If there are few strong institutions to buttress the community, real estate values
are compromised from the start. As discussed earlier, value is created by participation
and contribution that occurs and multiple fronts. Financial institutions, appraisers,
regulators, public officials, individuals, and communities need more comprehensive tools
to assess both the current condition and future prospects of a neighborhood and the real
estate that resides within it. Doing this effectively requires measuring the long term
value of investments that are capable of turning a marginal neighborhood around. On the
surface, many of these investments look like nothing but a sunk cost, when in fact they
have the potential in thoughtful execution to be precisely the opposite. A public library
could be offered as one example. This asset has has positive spillover effects on the
value of surrounding assets.

70

It was in the provision and preservation of public goods that the land trust found
its initial inspiration. In responding to what was really a market failure, the conservation
land trust provides a vehicle for managing public goods, in an environment where
creating a viable long-term proposition for public use has been difficult. The profitability
of the investment in this type of public good hinges upon realizing and distributing the
equity gains fairly, which requires an acknowledgement that equity gains are in reality
are most often the result of shared efforts. Both the conservation and community land
trust models have responded to a significant observation: the synergy between
individuals and the larger community has economic value, which is materially recognized
in the appreciation of physical assets. The CLT is shared-equity model that is designed to
accurately capture and distribute these returns.
In the open market, there is no shared equity model which mitigates risk yet
provides for equity gains, nor are there other recognized methods within real estate
markets that identify and minimize speculative risk. Without a CLT-like structure, home
ownership involves risk. Other methods that offer more flexibility and a different risk
profile are available. Another investment opportunity this is available to a select group of
individuals is the IDA (Individual Development Account). The ISOP (Individual Stock
Option Plan) is another type of individual account that has been proposed, with its
foundation in the financial framework that comprises the ESOP.
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Chapter Eight: Individually-owned Accounts that Facilitate a Broader-based
Distribution of Assets
The IDA (Individual Development Account
The vehicle for individual asset formation, separate of any relationships with a
particular corporation or service provider, is the (IDA), or Individual Development
Account. Invented by Michael Sherradon, the IDA matches an individual’s savings up to
a certain limit. Account funds can be used for housing, education, or business
development. (The Democracy Collaborative, 2005).
The goal of the IDA is to accumulate personal savings so that productive assets
can be acquired. Even though the goals of the 401(k) and the ESOP appear to be the
same as that of the IDA, the IDA has two fundamental distinctions. First, it has a shorterterm investment horizon, where one can use the account without penalty to acquire assets
today. Although one can borrow against a 401(k) or apply for a hardship withdrawal and
be approved under certain circumstances, the ultimate goal is to accrue tax-free funds for
retirement. Such is the case with the ESOP as well. Unless there is a special ESOP
diversification election or the employee leaves the company, the account can not be
borrowed against or liquidated.
The second key difference is how the IDA is funded. The IDA is a subsidized
account, where income levels required for qualification and percentage matching policies
are controlled at the state level. Regardless of state policy, the target market for the IDA
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is the working poor, whereas the 401(k) and ESOP are available to all employees,
independent of income level.
The ISOP (Individual Stock Ownership Plan)
Dovetailing off of the ESOP and the CSOP is another financial instrument called
the ISOP, or Individual Stock Ownership Plan. Although never formally recognized by
the IRS, the ISOP was part of legislative proposal termed the Accelerated Capital
Formation Act. As originally proposed in 1975, the purpose of the ISOP was to broaden
access to capital. Unlike the ESOP or the CSOP, the ISOP was not predicated upon a
prior relationship with a particular corporation, as either an employee or a customer. Nor
did the ISOP require that a shareholder be a customer purchasing services from a natural
monopoly or a community member with a public good stake in property or real estate
development. A definition of the ISOP as provided by Kurland (1977):
The ISOP is designed as a special kind of Individual Retirement Account (IRA) to
be set up by each citizen at any bank or approved financial institution, for
financing new stock issuances by any enterprise that can convince a commercial
bank that it has a viable (i.e., self-liquidating) capital project (Kurland, 1977, p.
1).
Because the ISOP was designed to be structurally and relationally independent, it
could function both as a long-term store of value for individuals and an ongoing source of
equity finance for multiple corporations. This flexibility opened up further possibilities
for the financial instrument, including the opportunity to serve as a central point for
individuals to roll over shares from an ESOP or CSOP.
Given its flexibility and broad structural framework, the ISOP could be used to
establish a diversified portfolio of assets for a broad range of people. It could also raise
equity finance for both start-up companies and corporate expansion.
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The ISOP becomes the CHA (Capital Homesteading Account)
To more clearly distinguish the scope of the opportunity and overall mission, the
ISOP was renamed the CHA, or Capital Homesteading Account. The CHA now forms
the cornerstone of a larger policy initiative, termed the Capital Homesteading Act. The
Capital Homesteading Act would do for capital what the original Homesteading Act of
1862 did for land: democratize the access to productive resources to stimulate national
growth and foster individual opportunity.
The CHA brings in an entirely new dimension to the stable of financial
instruments modeled after the ESOP. Most notably, the CHA goes beyond the creation
of equity finance in situations where there is either collateral or future earnings against
which a corporation can borrow. Because of the increased risk profile associated with the
CHA, there are more institutional components that are added to the mix to make the
situation more feasible.
Supporting Structures for the CHA
The FCCC (Federal Capital Credit Corporation).
One institutional component of the capital homesteading infrastructure is a
Federal Capital Credit Corporation, or FCCC. The FCCC serves not only as a
clearinghouse for potential investment opportunities, but as body that is capable of
evaluating potential risk, reward, and opportunity. Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney
(2004) offer the following explanation of the FCCC, an organization conceived by Dr.
Norman Bailey, former Special Assistant to President Reagan for International Economic
Affairs.
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The FCCC, which could be owned and controlled by CHA lenders and citizens,
would package insured CHA loans, create software for helping lenders to
scrutinize the feasibility of CHA loans, and set uniform standards for CHA
insurers, re-insurers, and lenders. The FCCC and competitors qualified by the
Federal Reserve would then bundle and take these securitized CHA loans to the
discount window of the regional Federal Reserve Bank (Kurland, Brohawn, and
Greaney, 2004, p. 39).
Within the proposed definition of the FCCC is found the genesis of another CHAsupporting organizational structure, one that serves as an insurer or re-insurer of CHA
loans. This organization would be termed the FCIC, or Federal Capital Insurance
Corporation.
The FCIC (Federal Capital Insurance Corporation).
To provide insurance for default risk, an FCIC, or Federal Capital Insurance
Corporation has been proposed. The FCIC would fund itself by collecting a risk
premium as part of the loan servicing fees. Individual financial institutions would collect
these payments, which would then be consolidated into an FCIC insurance fund. Another
possibility is the formation of a CCRC, or capital credit reinsurance corporation. The
reserves for the CCRC could be provided by federal, state, local government or be raised
from private sources.
Problems, Issues and Opportunities with the Supporting Structures
The supporting structures of the FCCC, FCIC, and CCRC have been proposed
because the CHA is designed to offer finance and investment opportunities to the
broadest possible population with the least tenable amount of risk. From the outset,
although the mission is laudable, the institutional structure is understandably suspect. Of
concern is that fact that the FCCC has a likeness to Fannie-Mae”, given its bundling
facility that would purchase loans from participating financial institutions. Also like
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Fannie Mae, the FCCC would have procedures and regulations for qualifying applicants
and financial institutions.
There are also perception and execution problems with the FCIC and especially
the CCRC, which appear on a cursory overview much like AIG, the large re-insurer. If
the credit corporation were to sell groups of loans and bundle them into complex
financial instruments where the value is the underlying asset was divorced or no longer
understood, this would be a problem. Given past problems, tying the FCIC directly to the
companies it insures, and avoiding the association of the capital homesteading idea with
the business of buying, selling, and insuring speculative financial instruments is
important.
What is important to remember, however, is that the idea of the CHA with an
insured component brings back some of individual financial surety that was lost in the
move from defined benefit to defined contribution programs. In this context, the FCIC is
not much different than the government-sponsored Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation. The only difference is that individuals can naturally diversify their
portfolios, and in the process, capital is directed into productive investment. Because of
the equity finance component, business has much to like about the CHA, which in this
realm mirrors aspects of the 401(k).
If executed with thought and care, the CHA has the potential to offer the best of
both the defined benefit and defined contribution worlds. The critical and unique
distinction that has been proposed, however, would be that the CHA architecture would
be owned by CHA financial institutions and CHA account holders. This eliminates much
conflict of interest by aligning motivation and incentives in the same way that the ESOP
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when well-executed has done for employees and employers. The ultimate challenge for
the CHA architecture would be to do what the current government organizations that
promote homeownership have not been able to do: to democratically expand the
ownership of capital, in the way that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were originally
conceived to democratically expand homeownership.
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion
This paper encourages the reader to think about the creation of economic value. It
is hoped that this effort will expand points of view that are largely influenced by
traditional economic models and standard policy approaches.
Simply on the premises of basic observation and experience, I have found
economic models that address production and investment to be limited in their
explanatory power, given their restrictive assumptions. These assumptions have imparted
a false sense of certainty, allowing us to base our understanding upon an incomplete
picture of what is really happening. The net result is that the sources of contribution to
productivity, especially the human elements that create value, often fail to be fairly
recognized or rewarded. Thus, the power of economic incentives to stimulate economic
progress and innovation are compromised.
These unidentified contributions to productivity have observable effects upon the
value of assets, the level of profits, and the return on investment. In each of these areas,
there is an also an opportunity to correct the distortion of incentives. In this paper, I have
highlighted a variety of options and methods, assessing their functionality and identifying
their strengths and weaknesses.
While these methods first and foremost promote efficiency and fairness, the
benefits are wide in both range and scope. They include the creation and preservation of
employment, the augmentation of income, and the stimulation of individual productive
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investment. Some of the methods discussed are expressly designed to mitigate financial
and asset-market risk, having built-in incentives that favor productive rather than
speculative investment.
The approaches that properly align individual incentives also solve problems for
corporations and communities. From the corporate perspective, the asset-distribution
methods alleviate the well-recognized problem of capital scarcity, which is affects both
current business operations and the opportunities for expansion. I find that the ESOP
(Employee Stock Ownership Plan), and other financial tools built on the foundation of
the ESOP, offer both opportunity and future promise when implemented with care.
The ESOP carves assets out of current productivity and finances investment by
anticipating the development of future productivity and capacity. Because this approach
stimulates effective demand, a positive, macroeconomic spillover effect is created. These
gains are not accomplished through the redistribution of assets, but through the sharing of
financial gains. Either a contribution to productivity or a natural claim to surplus
legitimizes the shared ownership. I hope that the justifiable nature of these distributions,
along with the macroeconomic benefit that these distributions create, can more easily
foster a consensus among policy-makers.
While these methods can be expanded to offer desirable benefits to a wide variety
of stakeholders within the corporation and community, reaping substantial returns is
dependent upon the participation and cooperation of all parties to the agreement.
Productivity increases with participation, and the fruits of laboring together to accomplish
a common goal can then be justly and fairly distributed. This is strong motivation to base
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relationships upon sharing, commitment, and engagement. This atmosphere facilitates
the free-flow of ideas and information, creating a desirable environment for innovation.
I hope that we are able to re-frame our conception of economics and the world to
see the possibilities and potential—the stored value and energy that resides within people,
natural resources, and financial capital—so that innovation will forward the goal of
economic progress. Implementing financial and organizational structures that that incent,
recognize, and reward contributions to productivity are a fundamental way of achieving
these goals.
With its ability determine the fate of all people on earth, economics is allpowerful. This position implies ethical accountability. As virtual stewards of the world
around us, our purview moves from what is, to what we can do, to what we should do.
By utilizing the wide range of policy tools available to us today--options that do not
involve the re-distribution of income, but justly and fairly expand the ownership,
management, and development of productive assets--we come closer to the meeting the
objective of making people’s lives better.
I will end with the encouraging words of Alfred Marshall, printed in Principles of
Economics textbook and quoted later by Bowles and Gintis (2000):
Now at last we are setting ourselves seriously to inquire whether it is necessary
that there should be any so called “lower classes” at all: that is whether there
need be large numbers of people doomed from their birth to hard work in order to
provide for others the requisites of a refined and cultured life; while they
themselves are prevented by their poverty and toil from having any share or part
in that life…the answer depends in a great measure upon fact and inferences that
are within the province of economics; and this is it which gives to economic
studies their chief and their highest interest (1930 (1980), pp. 3-4).
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